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Introduction 
History is filled with political abductions, incidents in which individuals are 
kidnapped and held hostage by hostile groups or states to gain leverage or legitimacy for 
their cause.
1
  Such episodes have been used since antiquity to highlight the failure of 
rulers to perform their single-most important function-- protecting citizens from harm.  
Consequently, kidnappings have opened up deep political chasms and often have been 
used by political actors to identify enemies, distill collective fears, clarify national 
deficiencies, redefine frontiers, and mobilize social movements.  They have long figured 
in justifications for both aggression and conciliation with neighbors.  Some political 
actors have capitalized on captivity to frame and highlight national weakness and the 
fecklessness of leaders.  Others have spun out accounts of heroism to demonstrate 
national strength and visionary leadership.  Either way, the manipulation of the captivity 
passion for political ends often has been used to generate public sympathy to reorient 
national policies.   
 
This essay examines two contemporary cases in which the same foreign 
adversary, North Korea (DPRK), violated the sovereignty of neighboring states.  North 
Korean abductions of Japanese and South Korean (ROK) nationals illuminate how 
“captivity narratives” can be differentially filtered, constructed and deployed; they offer a 
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 A review of the captivity narratives in comparative and historical perspectives is central to the larger 
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 2 
window on the mechanisms involved in policy capture-- the metaphorical analogue to the 
incident itself.   
 
 
The Comparison 
Comparing the South Korean and Japanese reactions to political captivity 
provides a valuable vantage point to assess institutional change in democratic states and 
ways in which these dynamics are connected to international politics.
2
  Jack Snyder’s 
explanation of how parochial interests can “highjack” foreign policy is particularly 
helpful in this regard.  Building upon a long tradition in comparative politics-- including 
assumptions about state capacity and the distribution of interests-- Snyder argues that 
groups favoring muscular foreign policies often enjoy advantages in “organizational 
persuasiveness”-- motivational advantages, control of information resources, and close 
ties to the state-- which enable them to capture national policy.
3
  Groups in society with 
expansionist interests, he argues, tend to be more compact and concentrated than their 
opponents.  In a cartelized polity, this provides institutional advantages that enable them 
to “propagate the myth of security through expansion in the guise of the general interest 
of society.”4  Armed with a persuasive idea and fortified by cartelized power, they can 
kidnap politics.  Snyder suggests further that the system may become so rigid-- either 
through logrolling or cognitive dissonance-- that the actors may misinterpret or ignore 
information pointing to overextension and end up with policies that harm the very interest 
groups that promoted them. 
  
The Japan-ROK comparison offers a particularly clear window on one of 
Snyder’s central questions: whether more open democracies are apt to correct for the 
most extreme excesses.
5
  Both the Japanese and South Korean political systems shifted 
between being highly cartelized and relatively more open and competitive.  From 1955 to 
2009 Japan was governed by what was considered a “one and a half party system” under 
the near hegemonic leadership of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).  During this same 
period, South Korea was governed by an authoritarian clique until 1987, when 
democratic politics were introduced.   By the 1990s, both countries had competitive party 
systems, regular elections, a nominally independent (and ideologically diverse) media, 
and open civil societies.  Captivity in both cases has been a compelling emotional issue, 
cutting to the heart of debates over how national identity and national interest are defined.  
In both South Korea and Japan, abductee family groups became particularly active just 
before and after summit meeting between their national leaders and Kim Jong Il.  Groups 
in civil society in both countries seized upon the human rights issue and attempted to ally 
with politicians to confront bureaucrats, manipulate public sentiment, and reorder 
national policy priorities. 
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 3 
While this comparison does not allow us to hold the international system perfectly 
constant, the foreign relations of Japan and the ROK also have much in common. 
Throughout the second half of the 20
th
 century and until the present, both countries have 
had the same powerful security partner (the United States) and each has faced an 
existential threat from the same hostile neighbor (North Korea).  The most significant 
structural difference derives from the different relations of Japan and South Korea to 
North Korea.  Unlike the Japanese, South Koreans all serve in the military and-- until 
Pyongyang’s nuclear tests-- have been exposed to a more direct threat from the North.  
Abductions, moreover, have been more widespread in South Korea than in Japan.  We 
will examine the relevance of these differences, but are struck by one commonality above 
all others, viz. by failing to prevent repeated violations of their sovereignty by North 
Korea and by failing to protect their citizens from harm by foreign agents, both states 
faced severe disapprobation for not performing adequately their most central function in 
international society.   
 
Despite important common features, however, we observe very different 
outcomes in South Korea and Japan on the abductee issue.  In Japan, the captivity 
narrative was used to shed harsh light on the discontents and dysfunctions of 
contemporary democratic politics and public policy.  The media, the political class, and 
the bureaucrats all shifted position on one of the most divisive and explosive issues in 
Japanese foreign and security policy.  Emotional appeals married to state failures were 
used to trump more dispassionate calculations of national interest.  There have been few 
heroic, stalwart men in Japan where the captivity narrative has been dominated by 
feckless, opportunistic politicians, cowed journalists, inept bureaucrats, and emboldened 
civic leaders on the right.
6
      
 
Seoul, on the other hand, successfully redirected efforts of similar groups to 
determine policy toward Pyongyang.  Unlike in Japan, where public opinion convulsed 
into paroxysms of demand making and finger-pointing, the South Korean public never 
rallied to the side of the abductees’ families and has not supported the combined efforts 
of family groups with right wing NGOs.  Although the majority of South Koreans agree 
that the POW/Abductees’ issue should be resolved in near future, only a small minority 
(7%) consider this to be the most important issue in North South dialogue in 2008, or 
even a priority in South-North relations.  Indeed, it is near the bottom of a long list in 
which the nuclear issue (29%), military tensions (28%), economic cooperation (16%), 
were far more important.
7
  The relative indifference of the South Korean public should 
not be surprising, for the words ‘POW’ or ‘abductees’ were not even mentioned in any 
obtainable surveys before 2007.
8
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7
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8
 Until 2001, the dispersed family issue was considered the top priority.  It is possible that the abductees’ 
issue was perceived as part of the dispersed family issue, but it seems that the South Korean public paid 
little attention to the issue of abduction until after the revelation of Japanese abductees.  It is of some 
interest that, as in Japan, those who oppose the South-North dialogue show more interest in the abductee 
issue. 
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As we shall see, these differences are reflected in policy.  In contrast to Japan, 
where the Liberal Democrats used the abduction issue to craft an unexpected victory in 
November 2003 and where a separate Cabinet Office was established on the issue with 
the prime minister as ex-officio chair, there was only minor policy adjustment on the 
abductee issue in South Korea.  The ROK government long conflated families separated 
by war with those separated by North Korean agents.  It long refused even to use the term 
“abduction,” and even after it began to do so, it refused to invoke it in negotiations with 
the DPRK.  The National Assembly did not establish an Abductees Compensation and 
Assistance Review Committee until April 2007, and the number of abductees and 
families receiving compensation is very limited.  In short, unlike Tokyo, Seoul never 
allowed its diplomacy to be dominated by the abductee issue.  It is as if there was no one 
to write South Korea’s captivity narrative. 
 
These differences are all the more curious given South Korea’s history of caustic 
political discourse, general characterizations of Korean public opinion as more volatile 
than Japanese public opinion, and the fact that the suffering of “separated families” is 
more widespread in Korea than in Japan.  Why was the Japanese state more entangled by 
a mobilized citizenry than the South Korean state?  Why were the less mobilized 
Japanese more agitated than the more politically experienced Koreans?  Why did 
professional activists in Japan so effectively use civic groups to integrate once quite 
marginal ideas into the political mainstream, alter the balance of power in political 
discourse, delegitimize once robust institutions, and undermine Japanese diplomacy 
whereas their counterparts in South Korea failed to generate more than intermittent media 
attention to their cause?  Why, in short, did the same politically motivated abductions by 
the same enemy actor exert disproportionately powerful effects on the foreign policies of 
similar states under similar structural circumstances?   
 
 
The Case of Japan  
Japan’s captivity narrative typically begins in November 1977 in Niigata, when a 
13 year-old middle school student, Yokota Megumi, was heading home from badminton 
practice.  After waving good-bye to her teammates, Megumi was grabbed off the street, 
trussed, stuffed into a Soviet military cargo bag, shoved into the rusting belly of a fishing 
trawler by North Korean agents and deposited in Pyongyang.  Her tragedy has had no 
end:  After isolation and reeducation, she taught Japanese at Kim Jong Il Political and 
Military University, married a South Korean abductee, and was reported to have 
committed suicide after a nervous breakdown in 1993.  Her mother, Sakie, and father, 
Shigeru, both ordinary parents caught in an extraordinary vise of anxiety, became 
especially effective advocates for the abductees.  Movies, anime, manga all made 
Megumi a cause célèbre, but her tale and her suffering was not limited to the Yokota 
household.  She was only one of several dozen young people-- all either kidnapped by 
North Korean agents in the late 1970s or simply “missing.” Some were snatched in Japan, 
others in Europe.  In October 2002, Kim Jong Il famously admitted to Prime Minister 
Koizumi Junichirō that freelancers within his government had abducted thirteen innocent 
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Japanese youths, but the National Police Agency claims the correct number is 40, and 
activist groups are championing as many as 500 cases. 
 
Each of these cases connects directly to the core institutions of Japanese politics 
and diplomacy: a) civil society, b) the political class, c) the media, and d) the state.  They 
connect to civil society because, after failing to draw public attention to their plight on 
their own, the families of the abductees attracted support from civic groups dedicated to 
overthrow of North Korea.
9
  The two most prominent such groups-- the Sukūkai (Rescue 
Association), a combined “support group and political action committee,” and the 
Kazokukai (Family Association)-- were set up in March 1997 by professional activists 
and came to have sizeable paid staffs with nearly one hundred branches across Japan.
10
  
Leaders of the Rescue Association and related civic groups have used the welfare of the 
abductees and their families to build a national megaphone for their cause.   Their success 
is manifest in many ways, including the role they may have played in authoring 
legislation to deal with aid to the abductees’ families and to stiffen sanctions on North 
Korea-- both unprecedented for NGOs in Japan, where laws are written almost entirely 
by bureaucrats. 
 
At first the families of abductees had trouble gaining public support.  On one 
memorable occasion, the mother of one abductee stood at the Sukiyabashi intersection in 
Tokyo, possibly the world’s busiest crosswalk, for an hour and gathered only one 
signature for her petition to the government for assistance.  Others were criticized for 
calling attention to themselves.  Over time, though, the cause attracted support from civic 
groups dedicated to the overthrow of the Kim dynasty in North Korea.  These groups 
gained the confidence of grateful abductee families and came to orchestrate their politics 
by helping them establish their own association, by controlling their access to the media, 
and by controlling their visits to North Korea.  As Megumi’s father, Yokota Shigeru, 
explained about Satō Katsumi, the founder of the Rescue Association: “We know Satō is 
a right-winger, but we need all the help we can get from whomever we can get it from.”11 
 
The Rescue Association gave senior posts to conservative politicians and worked 
with them to use the abductee issue to derail normalization talks and shift the 
government’s overall approach to North Korea.  Within two years, Prime Minister 
Obuchi declared the abductee issue to be “a matter of personal concern” and Japanese 
diplomats began meeting North Korean officials wearing the association’s blue ribbons 
as signs of solidarity and protest.  On those occasions when the government did not 
respond as they wished, the Family and Rescue Associations orchestrated sit-ins at the 
prime minister’s office.  At the height of their influence, the abductee groups were able to 
meet with any public official in Japan or in the United States-- including foreign 
ministers, prime ministers, the secretary of state, and the president. 
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In this way, the Japanese abductions illuminate larger dynamics within Japan’s 
political class.  The Japan Communist Party (JCP) has been at odds with North Korea 
since the 1960s over Kim Il Sung’s heterodox Marxism and it was a JCP staffer who first 
connected North Korea to the disappearances for the families in January 1988.  The Japan 
Socialist Party (JSP) has had deeper connections to North Korea and to the North Korean 
affiliated minority community in Japan.  Unfortunately for the families, however, the JSP 
(today called the Social Democratic Party, or SDP) refused to pursue the allegations and, 
rather than help secure the release of the abductees, party leaders actively covered up 
North Korean treachery.  Members of the now defunct anti-communist Democratic 
Socialist Party, such as Araki Kazuhiro, became leading advocates of the abductee 
families.
12
   
 
But it was relations with the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) that were 
most valuable for the families and, since the LDP was governing, more consequential for 
Japanese politics and diplomacy.  Pragmatists who sought normalization with North 
Korea primarily as a way to enrich their own constituents and maintain power had 
dominated the LDP.  But LDP hardliners rallied to the cause of the abductees, using them 
to highlight their concerns about national sovereignty, military debility, and regional 
security.  Future Prime Minister Abe Shinzō, who had never been particularly active on 
the abductee issue, recognized an opportunity to seize power from the pragmatists.  With 
the support of the parent of Arimoto Keiko, one of the abductees, he and several allies 
attacked the existing Diet member’s League for Early Repatriation of Japanese Citizens 
Kidnapped by North Korea (rachi giren) as too conciliatory, and formed a more hawkish, 
suprapartisan group of legislators.  This newer association rejected compromise on the 
abduction issue, called for investigations into the Korean-affiliated credit unions and an 
end to all cash transfers to the DPRK, and proposed legislation to prohibit Koreans 
residing in Japan from visiting North Korea.  Abe thereupon also assumed an honorary 
post in the Rescue Association and stimulated considerable public agitation over the 
abductee issue in order to engineer an unlikely LDP victory in November 2003.
13
   
 
As the revisionists consolidated power with the help of the abductee issue, the 
Japanese right became more prominent.   One can see the involvement of the nationalist 
right in the abductee issue as evidence of the generally rightward drift in Japanese 
politics.  Alternatively, one can see the reverse, a “mainstreaming” of the right, in which 
once marginal ideas have been embraced by the center.  Those activists and politicians 
leading the abductee issue have also been active combatants in Japan’s culture wars, 
pressing forward to secure right-wing preferences, such as elevation of the emperor, 
revision of the constitution, revising accepted interpretations of the Pacific War, 
revisiting the conclusions of the Tokyo War Crimes Trial, confronting territorial disputes 
with Japan’s neighbors, and enhancing Japan’s national security through the acquisition 
of more modern weapons. 
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Public agitation over the abductee issue was abetted, if not created, by a media 
that awoke late to the issue.  For decades, despite a drumbeat of reports in the 
conservative Sankei Shimbun, the mainstream media would not touch the issue, 
apparently fearing protests by associations of Korean residents and by the leftwing 
parties.  Even after Kajiyama Seiroku, one of the most powerful LDP politicians of the 
day, testified in Diet in 1988 that there indeed may have been North Korean kidnappings, 
no major daily apart from the like-minded Sankei reported his testimony.  Indeed, the rest 
of the (largely center-left) press ignored the issue for sixteen years, until after the 
institutional suicide of the Socialist Party and the detailed, irrefutable, description of the 
scheme by a North Korean defector.   
 
Then, after Prime Minister Koizumi visited Pyongyang and elicited the formal 
acknowledgement of the abductions in 2002, the media reversed itself and frothed into 
high dudgeon.  Other issues palled and substantive policy debate about how to deal with 
North Korea ceased.  It became impossible to question the motives of the families or of 
their advocates in civil society and the political class.  One Diet member said that it’d be 
“political suicide” even to suggest that proliferation of nuclear weapons ought to be of 
equal or greater concern than the release of the abductees.  At that point, the state media 
stepped in as well.  In 2006, the government broadcaster NHK was instructed by the 
Prime Minister’s Office to increase radio broadcasting of the issue.  According to one 
senior broadcasting executive, the mention of any criticism of the way the issue was 
evolving was “like stepping on a religious icon.”14  An animated film, “Megumi,” was 
made with public funds and distributed with a government produced documentary by 
consulates around the world.  Credible evidence of a cover-up of the results of forensic 
testing of Megumi’s ashes, published in the British journal Nature, was denied vigorously 
by the government and ignored thoroughly by the Japanese press.
15
   
 
The relationship of the media to the abductee issue and its contribution to this 
national convulsion raise important questions about political intimidation in Japan.  Both 
the “nationalist left” and the “nationalist right” seem to have taken turns intimidating the 
media and politicians.  While for decades, it had been impossible to criticize North Korea 
without being attacked by those who viewed Pyongyang as a progressive neighbor, it 
became open season on those who had been advocating normalization after 2002.  Bullets 
were mailed to the Tokyo offices of the Korean residents’ association (Chōsen 
Sōren/Chongryun) by a self identified “North Korea Suppression Corps” and shots were 
fired at a Nagoya branch of a Chōsen Sōren/Chongryun-affiliated bank.  A bomb was 
found at the home of the diplomat who had engineered the Pyongyang visit for Prime 
Minister Koizumi, a criminal act condoned publicly by the conservative governor of 
Tokyo.  The home of a leading centrist politician, Nonaka Hiromu, was encircled by 
sound trucks, forcing him to disband the Japan-North Korea Friendship Association he 
had championed and convincing him to retire from politics.  Meanwhile, abductees and 
their families were encouraged to draw swords in the culture wars.  The mother of a 
returned abductee spoke at a Diet hearing in favor of constitutional revision.  Other 
Family Association members spoke out in favor of textbook revision and human rights in 
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China-- foundational issues on the nationalist right.  Some went further and advocated the 
rounding up and expulsion of all North Korean residents of Japan.   
 
The final domestic institution on which the abductee issue sheds considerable 
light is the state itself.  The aging literature on the “administrative state” had always 
seemed apt vis-à-vis Japan.
16
  Japanese bureaucrats had long been depicted as the best, 
brightest, most competent and most incorruptible products of an unassailably meritocratic 
system.  The easy contrast was made to Japan’s dim, incompetent, and highly corruptible 
political class.  Politicians, an inordinate number of whom have “inherited” their father’s 
seats, were cast as the “botchan” (princelings) to the bureaucrats’ philosopher kings.  A 
succession of deeply troubling scandals and profound bungling-- including accidents at 
unregulated nuclear reactors, corruption of the nation’s blood supply while health 
officials golfed with pharmaceutical executives, and the loss of 50 million pension 
records-- has proved otherwise.     
 
So has the abductee issue.  Abductee families complained for years about 
officials’ “unhelpfulness,” “arrogance,” and “callousness.”  Hasuike Toru, the elder 
brother of an abductee, insists that his fight was against both “the rogue nation [North 
Korea] and the incompetent nation [Japan].”17 Fishermen had been reporting strange 
transmissions and odd vessels to the authorities since the mid-1970s.  Nothing was done.  
Families of those who disappeared from European holidays or study tours were told 
dismissively by diplomats that “young people often disappear into new lives in Europe.”  
When Terakoshi Tomoe, a char woman and mother of a suspected abductee, sought help 
from the Japanese police, they tossed away the letter she had received from him.  The 
Foreign Ministry kept the issue quiet, it said, so as not to jeopardize the abductees.  It is 
more likely, however, that they were afraid of jeopardizing the delicate process of 
normalization sought by LDP pragmatists then in power.  Once the revisionists 
consolidated power, the Japanese state danced to new music.    
 
The question now that the LDP has been crushed is whether that music finally has 
stopped-- and even if not, whether it is very far past its crescendo.  There is a concern 
among those on the right that the election of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in 
August 2009 will lead to a softening in Japan’s position on the abductee issue.  Although 
the DPJ was forced by electoral pressures to fall in line with the LDP’s tough position on 
North Korea after 2002, it earlier had favored normalization.
18
  When they were back 
benchers in the Sakigake Party, Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio and Deputy Prime 
Minister Kan Naoto both went to Pyongyang as part of the Watanabe “rice” mission in 
1995.  Hatoyama had even signed a petition for the release of a former North Korean spy 
held in a South Korean jail who reportedly had been involved in Yokota Megumi’s 
abduction.
19
  Even earlier, DPJ representative Ishii Hajime, was the head of the advance 
team for the 1990 Kanemaru mission, “unofficial” normalization talks in which DPJ 
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Secretary General Ozawa Ichiro also played a major role.
20
  The hard line position indeed 
had been made precarious by the election: several of the most senior supporters of the 
abductee families-- including the late Nakagawa Shōichi, Sasakawa Takashi, and 
Nishimura Shingo-- lost their seats in the DPJ landslide.
21
  Thus, immediately after the 
election, the Sukūkai organized rallies and leaders of the Kazokukai visited the prime 
minister.
22
  They may have had reason for concern, but Mr. Hatoyama appointed the 
acting chair of the bipartisan Diet members association on the abductees’ issue, Nakai 
Hiroshi, to the Cabinet as chief of the National Public Safety Commission and asked him 
to look after the abductees.  Although Hatoyama signaled to Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao 
and South Korean President Lee Myung-bak that his government would be comfortable 
with the abductee issue being pursued “in parallel” with the nuclear issue in the Six Party 
Talks, there is no indication six months later that this has been the case.   
 
Thus, the Japanese captivity narrative also has international implications, initially 
and most directly, of course, related to normalization talks with North Korea.
23
  If Kim 
Jong Il thought his 2002 acknowledgement and apology would grease the skids for 
economic aid and normalization, he seriously misjudged Japan’s democratic politics.  He 
got, instead, a “tumult of emotions.”24  Not only was the abductee issue used to 
consolidate the power of the LDP’s revisionist wing, but bilateral relations became much 
more fraught. The Japanese government revised its Foreign Exchange Control Law, 
banned the entry of the North Korean ferry to Japanese ports, and banned the return to 
Japan of any resident Koreans who might visit North Korea.  Between 1991-2003, more 
than 600 books were published in Japan on North Korea, nearly all “virulently hostile.”25  
No Japanese government was going to proceed on normalization with North Korea while 
the Japanese public was being lathered into a collective rage by the media, conservative 
politicians, and groups in civil society with nationalist agendas.   
 
This extended to the multilateral “6 Party Talks” on denuclearization of the 
Korean peninsula.  The Japanese government insisted on the return of all abductees 
during these negotiations, a position that the other participants viewed as a distraction 
from the more important issue of nuclear proliferation.
26
  The irony, of course, was that 
even though the Japanese government had been first to suggest the format, the 6 Party 
Talks proceeded without settlement of Japan’s primary concern-- under mostly Chinese 
leadership.  Getting Japan back onto the same page as U.S., Chinese, South Korean, and 
Russian negotiators is now a central task for the Hatoyama government.  The new prime 
minister acknowledged as much by focusing almost entirely on the nuclear issue in his 
first major speech at the General Assembly meeting in New York in September 2009 and 
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by pledging to South Korean President Lee Myung-bak that his government would work 
on denuclearization of the north.
27
   
 
Nor have bilateral relations with South Korea been consistently healthy.  Japan’s 
position on the abductee issue seems to have reinforced decades of distrust on the 
peninsula.  Not surprisingly, public opinion in the ROK has been sympathetic to North 
Korean claims of Japanese “plunder” of the peninsula during thirty-five years of colonial 
rule between 1910-1945.  The public has been reminded constantly of the abduction of 
millions Koreans during the occupation to work as slaves in Japan’s mines, factories, and 
military brothels.  Former South Korean President Roh Moo-Hyun linked Japan’s 
colonial atrocities to the current abduction issue and underlined this sense of hypocrisy: 
“Japan should put itself in Korea’s shoes and understand the anger of our people who 
suffered thousands and tens of thousands of times as much pain …”28  This mutual 
distrust was reflected in a new regional security architecture first proposed by Prime 
Minister Abe in 2007.  His much ballyhooed “arc of freedom and prosperity,” promoted 
to unite the capitalist democracies in the region (presumably to balance a rising China), 
included Australia, India, and the United States, but pointedly left out South Korea. 
 
For its part, the United States, that never silent partner in domestic Japanese 
politics, has been of two minds on the abductee issue.  Although President Bush met with 
Megumi’s parents in the White House in April 2006, although U.S. Embassy officials 
met with the Kazokukai regularly, and although Secretary of State Hillary Clinton met 
with them in her February 2009 visit to Japan, the U.S. government would not allow 
domestic Japanese politics to interfere with its larger strategic concern-- proliferation of 
WMD on and from the peninsula.  On several occasions, in fact, the abductee issue 
served to drive a wedge in US-Japan relations.  Prime Minister Koizumi visited 
Pyongyang in 2002, despite White House objections.  Tanaka Hitoshi, the chief architect 
of that visit, writes in his memoirs that the overture had the understanding of Deputy 
Secretary of State Armitage, but was opposed by Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and Vice 
President Cheney.
29
  He is also reported to have declared, “We don’t have to ask the U.S. 
for approval every time we come up with a foreign policy initiative.  We are not a 
protectorate of the United States.”30  That may be so, but when the U.S. government 
removed North Korea from its list of “state sponsors of terrorism” in late 2008, it limited 
Japan’s leverage on North Korea and generated serious and widespread anxiety in Japan 
about the quality of the American commitment to Japanese security and the future of the 
alliance.   
 
The prominence of the captivity narrative on Japan’s official agenda invites 
questions about the alliance and about the region’s security architecture going forward.  
Capture of the abductee issue by the right in Japan gave reason to expect support for a 
further strengthening of the Japanese military and a further weakening of Tokyo’s 
diplomacy.  For some activists, after all, this was the whole point.  Hostility with North 
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Korea justified Japan’s military buildup and the removal of existing constraints on its use 
of force.  The new government, operating with a more pliant public, claims to have other 
important priorities.  Hence, it is also important to determine if Japan’s elevation of the 
abduction issue and its increasing muscularity created long term difficulties with its 
Chinese and South Korean neighbors, or if the recent shift to a more Asia-oriented 
government will open new opportunities for Japanese diplomacy.   
 
 
The Case of South Korea  
 Many of the fundamentals of the South Korean story are remarkably similar to the 
Japanese one, though they have been painted from a much more chaotic palette.  The Red 
Cross reports that more than 7,000 South Koreans citizens were abducted during the 
Korean War and all but 337 had died by 2002.
31
  Abductee family groups claim the 
number is much higher.  One group claims that based on a 1952 document, 83,000 South 
Korean citizens, many of them soldiers, found themselves on the wrong side of the DMZ 
at the end of the war.
32
  The wartime abductions have been traced to a 1946 
memorandum penned by Kim Il Sung, entitled: “On Transporting Intellectuals from 
South Korea” and to one in 1950 from the Kangwon Province Home Affairs Bureau 
labeled: “On the Cooperative Project Concerning the Transfer of Seoul Citizens.”  
Following the guidelines therein, North Korean soldiers visited private homes seeking 
specific individuals-- primarily intellectuals, journalists, public officials, and students-- 
for forced relocation in the north.  While the North’s target of 500,000 was beyond 
ambitious, tens of thousands of southern residents were snatched and transferred to 
northern mines and farms, particularly in the early months of the war.
33
 In 2009, the 
government estimated 560 South Korean POWs were still alive in the north.
34
 
 
The numbers of abductions subsided after the war, but were never eliminated. A 
steady stream of abductions is recorded from 1953 to the present.  The Korean Institute 
for National Unification reports that nearly 4,000 ROK citizens-- including five high 
school students and a school teacher visiting Norway-- have been abducted to North 
Korea since the armistice in 1953 “partly because North Korea may have found their 
knowledge and manpower useful.”35  Most of the postwar abductees were fishermen, but 
sailors, students, and passengers aboard a high-jacked KAL flight were also kidnapped.  
Like their Japanese counterparts, South Korean high school students were swept off 
beaches by North Korean agents in the late 1970s.  Some 500 of the post-armistice 
abductees are believed to remain alive and in detention across the 38
th
 parallel today.
36
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Some of these abductees have been used to train North Korean agents at the Center for 
Revolutionizing South Korea, a Potemkin village-like replica of the ROK for graduates 
of the Kim Il Sung Political Military College.  According to government officials, others 
were themselves trained as spies, and some broadcast propaganda to the South.
37
   For 
this reason, all returned abductees were suspected North Korean agents and all were 
subjected to intensive interrogation, sometimes including torture.
38
  Complicating this 
were the abductions of some one hundred ethnic Koreans with Chinese citizenship, most 
of whom had been involved in efforts to help North Korean refugees escape across the 
northern frontier.
39
  Pyongyang, for its part, has always denied holding any South Korean 
nationals or ethnic Koreans from China against their will, though it has from time to time 
responded positively to calls for resolution of the status of missing persons.
40
 
 
As in Japan, the abductee issue connects to-- and illuminates-- the core 
institutions of South Korean national politics: civil society, the media, the political class, 
and the state itself.  The first stirrings of Korean civil society on the abduction issue came 
during the Korean War, when the Korean War Abductees Family Association (KWAFA) 
was established in September 1951 in anticipation of an agreement for family exchanges 
after the armistice.  Although KWAFA helped the government and the Red Cross 
compile five official lists of tens of thousands of abductees, none were ever 
acknowledged or returned by the DPRK.
41
  Failing to achieve its goals-- in part because 
some “escaped” abductees returned to the south as North Korean spies-- KWAFA was 
disbanded in June 1960.
42
   
 
After a period of general quiescence on the abductee issue, several new groups 
appeared after the June 2000 Kim Dae-jung/Kim Jong Il “Sunshine Summit.” The 
"Families of Abducted and Detained in North Korea" (FADN) was formed by seven 
abductee families in February 2000, but an “Abductees’ Family Union” (AFU) preferring 
a more aggressive political agenda, split away soon thereafter.  In November 2000, 
members of the wartime KWAFA-- and their children-- created the “Family Group for 
the Korean War Abducted Persons.”  It again changed its name to the Korean War 
Abductee Family Union (KWAFU) in September 2001, and compiled a list of nearly 
95,000 abductees about whom it demanded a full accounting.
43
  A “Citizen's Coalition for 
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Human Rights of Abductees and North Korean Refugees” (CHNK) was organized in 
March 2001 by Do Hee-yoon, a former student activist and graduate of the patriotic 
Young Korean Academy (Heung Sadan), to coordinate the activities and demands of 
some twenty-five different NGOs.
44
  In July 2009, seven South Koreans who had been 
kidnapped and held for decades by North Korea formed the Returned Abductees' 
Committee to raise awareness of the issue.  One leader, Go Myung-seob, spent 29 years 
in North Korea after being kidnapped from a fishing boat in 1975 along with 32 other 
men.  Other leaders include Lee Jae-geun, the first abductee to escape and return to the 
south, as well as three North Korean defectors who refused to be identified.
45
 
 
Activists and officials suggest several ways to categorize the South Korean 
abductee associations.  The range of NGO demands is, indeed, quite wide—and has 
changed over time.  According to Dr. Lee Keum-soon at the Institute for National 
Unification: “Before the 2000 [Sunshine] summit, even the families paid little attention 
[to the abduction issue].  They did not know if their relatives were abducted or simply 
missing.”46  According to Koo Byoung-sam, the official at the Ministry of Unification 
responsible for liaison with these groups, they can be distinguished by their tactical 
preferences.  The more assertive groups, like AFU, he suggests, are “issue makers.”47  
Indeed, AFU’s president, Choi Sung-yong, claims to have “agents” in North Korea.  Choi 
was responsible for confirming the identity of Kim Young-nam, the teenage abductee 
who became Yokota Megumi’s husband.  Choi claims that he has been so vocal that the 
claims, that the South Korean government provided him office space in downtown Seoul.  
He attributes the unusually heavy security of this commercial building to “death threats 
from North Korea.”48 
 
Koo labels KWAFU and other, more passive groups, “information gatherers” who 
seek to establish facts that would justify their claims.  Lee Mi-li, the president of 
KWAFU and the daughter of an abductee, describes her group’s activities in just this 
way.  KWAFU’s primary goal is to get information on wartime abductees from North 
Korea, and believed that the Sunshine Policy would purchase it.  But she insists that the 
important difference is between the wartime groups and the postwar ones, noting that the 
former receive no compensation under the law, and suggesting that the latter do not fully 
respect their claims and rights.
49
  Other observers note that some groups are more 
interested in maximizing the compensatory stipends due them under the 2007 legislation 
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than in pursuing a larger political agenda, but most acknowledge that for many, the 
“recovery of honor” is of paramount importance.50     
 
As in the Japanese case, some South Korean abductee groups sought and found 
common cause with more broadly based conservative and anti-communist groups in civil 
society.  While FADN and KWAFU have been generally apolitical, AFU has been highly 
mobilized, engaging in both legal and illegal activities, including protesting in front of 
the MOU minister’s home, harassing members of the victim recognition deliberation 
committee, and reportedly hiring agents to infiltrate North Korea.
51
 AFU claims to have 
helped all eight of the escaped abductees reach South Korea.  After sending balloons 
across the DMZ with the names of abductees and drawing strong protest from the DPRK 
in 2008, anti-communist NGOs including AFU sent North Korean banknotes and 
propaganda fliers aloft across the border in 2009.  The South Korean government 
considered legal measures to block these acts, but reportedly was intimidated by the 
ability of such anti-communist NGOs as “Fighters for a Free North Korea” in alliance 
with the AFU to mobilize conservative opinion.
52
  Unlike Japan, however, where the 
alliance of conservative culture warriors and abductee family groups enjoyed broad 
support and led to significant policy changes, these actions were met with disinterest and 
even opprobrium from the general public, the government, and from other 
abductees/refugee organizations in South Korea.  As noted above, even the eight 
abductees whom the AFU claims to have rescued formed their own civic group out of a 
concern that the AFU activism was counterproductive. 
 
For most of the past fifty years these groups achieved very little.  Activists 
attribute their inability to affect South Korean policy to inattention by the media, and 
government officials agree, suggesting that the abductee issue in South Korea “is difficult 
to publicize.”53  Although the return home of an abductee-- the aforementioned Lee Jae-
geun escaped from North Korea that same month-- attracted considerable media 
attention, the press was otherwise largely disinterested in the abduction problem.  As in 
Japan, conservative newspapers, like Chosun Ilbo, have paid closer attention to the 
abductee issue than have progressive ones.  But overall, there has been little sustained 
coverage in the Korean media.  The Ministry of Unification official responsible for the 
issue reports that media attention has been “sporadic” and that since 2007 he has been 
contacted more often by the Japanese than by the Korean press.
54
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This is not to suggest that the South Korean media was uniformly disinterested, or 
that, as in the Japanese case, their lack of attention was the product of political 
intimidation.   Indeed there have been moments when the abductee issue flared into fuller 
view-- often fueled by negative comparisons of ROK efforts with what are perceived as 
Japanese (and later, U.S.) “successes.”  The admission of the abductions and the apology 
by Kim Jong Il to Prime Minister Koizumi in October 2002 reopened the issue of North 
Korean kidnappings of South Korean citizens, “in a more explosive political and social 
form.”55  Two days after the October 2002 Pyongyang Declaration, FADN and KWAFU 
petitioned the South Korean government to put the abductee issue on the agenda for any 
future unification talks.
56
  ROK citizens resented that the Japanese received an apology 
and acknowledgment while they were stonewalled.  According to Yonhap, “the issue 
became fodder for opposition parties and civic groups to pressure the government.”57  
Mirroring the demands of Japanese groups, some South Korean NGOs demanded that 
Seoul withhold all aid to Pyongyang until the abductee issue could be similarly rectified.  
Opposition presidential candidate, Lee Hoi-chang, “bashed the government,” promising 
to do more to get Pyongyang to answer for the kidnappings.
58
  One conservative editorial, 
reacting to the situation of an abducted fisherman, Im Guk-jae, fairly shouts at the ROK 
government: 
 
“When he was abducted, Im believed that his country would rescue him soon.  He 
waited and waited, and for fifteen long years his country did nothing… Im is now 
presumed to be in a concentration camp.  Cold political logic aside, has the 
government of the Republic of Korea ever had a shred of feeling for the man?”59   
 
Resentment of the ability of the Japanese and the US governments to succeed 
with Pyongyang continued to run high in South Korea-- this, despite the fact that Choi 
Woo-young, a founder of the FADN, explicitly acknowledges the Japanese kazokukai as 
a model in the formation of his group in February 2000.
60
  In April 2006, a newspaper 
editorialized that Seoul “should be ashamed” that Tokyo was doing its job for it on the 
abduction front.
61
  In August 2009, former US President Bill Clinton traveled to 
Pyongyang to secure the release of two U.S. reporters who had been captured by North 
Korean soldiers after they entered DPRK territory.  Abductee NGOs in the Republic of 
Korea had the same reaction to their release that counterpart groups in Japan had-- 
exasperation that American pressure worked and frustration with their own governments 
for their inability to secure the release of their own, longer suffering brethren.
62
  The 
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Chosun Ilbo frames the criticism of Seoul against the successes of Washington and 
Tokyo: 
 
“The United States and Japan, quite unlike South Korea, never slacken the reins 
in demanding due protection of their own nationals from the North while squarely 
facing Pyongyang on its nuclear program … The [ROK] government cannot even 
find the right words to bring its own citizens home when the North abducts them, 
yet it continues to give Pyongyang billions of dollars in food and fertilizer aid 
every year.  That is what it calls dialogue.”63 
 
More recently, it editorialized: 
 
“Officials from the previous two administrations sat down in hundreds of 
meetings with North Koreans but did not dare even to mention the issue ...  If 
Seoul were to show the same resolve as the Japanese government, with the 
president or prime minister personally leading a committee focusing on the issue, 
the family members of POWs, abduction victims and other members of separated 
families could at least have some hope.”64 
 
But support for Japanese efforts has been mixed in South Korea.  In August 2007, 
the Investigation Commission on Missing Japanese Probably Connected to North Korea 
(Tokutei Shissōsha Mondai Chōsakai), a particularly insistent Japanese abductee group 
led by Araki Kazuhiro that had split from the Rescue Committee, attempted to release 
several balloons from South to North Korea with information about missing Japanese 
suspected of being in the DPRK.  The effort was opposed by FADN, which claimed that 
such an attempt would adversely affect scheduled meetings of the Red Cross on the 
abductee and POW issues.  Some suggest that the sympathy of Koreans for the Japanese 
abductees is limited by a well documented history of Japanese abductions of Korean 
women and sex slaves.  As one government official explains: “Because of Japanese 
colonialism, Koreans in the north and south have a deep sense of distrust [of Japan].”65  
AFU’s Choi, a former civil servant who once had collaborated with Araki’s 
“Investigation Commission’s” balloon projects, has testified in the Japanese Diet but now 
insists he “would not return to Japan even if invited.”66  Choi suggests that: 
 
“Our characteristics conflict.  Japan’s approach is too political.  [The abductee 
issues in Japan] is part of a bigger agenda.  Abduction is a crime and should not 
have been negotiated.  You do not negotiate with criminals.”67   
 
Many other aspects of the Japanese approach are problematic for Choi, including 
how the Japanese government and civic groups forced the returned abductees to remain 
in Japan, abandoning their children in North Korea.  Choi is also put off by the behavior 
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of the Japanese media.  When he returned from North Korea with seven abductees, he 
says the news barely was reported in Japan, even though unconfirmed rumors about 
Japanese abductees are heavily covered.  He concludes sardonically that “Japan only 
talks about itself.”  But his larger complaint is with Kim Jong Il, who apologized to the 
Japanese while denying any abductions of South Koreans.
68
   
 
Still, there has been useful collaboration between South Korean and Japanese 
abductee activists-- particularly among those whose larger goal is the “punishment” of 
North Korean regime.
69
  Mr. Do reports regular ties and meetings with Mr. Araki and 
says that his Citizens’ Commission and Araki’s Investigation Commission plan jointly to 
appeal their respective cases to the International Criminal Court.
70
   Nor are these ties are 
limited to the more ideologically oriented groups.  President Lee of KWAFU reports 
having been invited to meetings by leaders of both the Japanese Rescue and the Family 
Associations.  She has met with Yokota Megumi’s father, Shigeru, as well as with 
activists such as Sato Katsumi and Araki Kazuhiro.   Abductee groups in both countries, 
moreover, have found common cause in a multinational coalition of abductee groups that 
include NGOs from Romania, Thailand, Vietnam, and the United States.
71
  
 
Several reasons have been advanced to explain the South Korean media’s 
treatment of the abductee issue, some of which highlight the complicity of the South 
Korean government itself.  Unlike Japan, where the abductees were so clearly innocent 
youths, many of the Korean abductees could not be distinguished easily from defectors.  
As a result, the return of those who were away less than two years was met with 
considerable suspicion by the government officials with responsibility for state security.  
Rather than welcome them home, South Korean intelligence officials considered the 
returnees security risks and aggressively interrogated them, never quite absolving them of 
suspicion.  Their families were likewise closely monitored and subjected to various forms 
of discrimination in the workplace and in education.  Until 1989, they were barred from 
government jobs-- most notably from entrance to the military academy-- and were subject 
to government surveillance.
72
  Not only had they suffered with the rest of the nation 
through a devastating war, and not only had they lost loved ones about whom there was 
no information, but now they were treated as likely spies for the North and sanctioned 
officially.
73
  At the same time, according to one analyst, many families of missing 
persons avoided making public demands both because they understood this would attract 
state sanctions and, in some cases, out of a concern that investigations might reveal more 
than they wished known about their relatives.
74
    
 
                                                 
68
 Interview: Choi Sung-yong, Abductees’ Family Union, Seoul, 21 December 2009. 
69
 This, according to Do Hee-yoon, Citizens’ Commission for Human Rights and North Korean Abductees, 
Seoul, 15 December 2009. 
70
 Interview: Do Hee-yoon, Citizens’ Commission for Human Rights and North Korean Abductees, Seoul, 
15 December 2009. 
71
 Choe, Chang-woo. Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission, Seoul, 18 December 2009. 
72
 Interview, Kim Woong-ki, Database Center for North Korean Human Rights, Seoul 17 December 2009. 
73
 Arrington, 2007, p.10. 
74 Lee Keum-soon, Institute for National Unification, Seoul, 16 December 2009. 
 18 
There is also the issue of official recognition.  KWAFU has argued that by 
acknowledging fewer than 500 abductees, the Seoul government has denied the existence 
of Korean War abductions.  Angry at the government’s use of terms such as “missing 
persons” or “separated family members” rather than abductees, the KWAFU filed suit 
against the government in 2006.
75
  Lee Mi-il, the KWAFU leader, insisted that these 
people be called “what they are-- kidnapping victims.”76  The FADN lost a similar suit in 
2002 both in the lower court and on appeal.
77
   
 
These separate suits belie a more significant problem-- the wartime abductees’ 
organizations and the postwar ones never united under a single banner.  The latter have 
been focused exclusively on compensation and the immediate return of their loved ones, 
whereas the former focus on confirmation of their relatives’ whereabouts and on family 
reunions.
78
  Some 127,000 South Koreans have applied for cross-border family reunions, 
but fewer than 500 a year have participated in the limited number of meetings arranged to 
date.
79
   Moreover, as noted above, ideological splits in the postwar groups and the 
inability of the right to monopolize the human rights agenda in South Korea have 
rendered the abductee issue a less powerful political tool in South Korea than it has been 
in Japan. 
 
The South Korean government raised the issue of the missing only intermittently 
with the North, and never used it as the sine qua non for normalization as did the 
government of Japan. To the contrary, with the DPRK refusing to acknowledge holding 
POWs or abductees, the South Korean government turned to what it considered a “more 
realistic” term: “separated” families.80  But even then, progress and media attention were 
limited. Although there have been dozens of escapes and defections, by 2004 only 
nineteen families had been temporarily reunited and as late as 2009, the DPRK continued 
to refuse to discuss the abduction issue.  Whether defectors or not, the fact is that the 
abduction issue is only part of the larger problems of displacement and family division 
that affect a much larger number of South Koreans.  Thus, abduction is subsumed under-- 
and is clouded by—some of the most vexing issues in Korean social and political life.   
 
This is reflected in the way the Korean state is organized to deal with the 
abduction issue, an issue which has never been high on the government’s list of priorities. 
For years, according to one official, “we worried more about spies than about 
abductees.”81  Responsibility for the abductees-- their identification, return, and 
compensation to them and to their families-- resides in the Ministry of Unification, where 
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precious few resources are dedicated to the problem.    The abductee office was created 
only in 2000 and is occupied by just a single official who describes his work as 
“frustrating.”82   The official spends time meeting with or talking by telephone to 
abductee group leaders-- particularly AFU’s Choi, with whom he reports “two or three 
contacts each week” and with KWAFU’s Lee, with whom he reports weekly contact.83  
Other agencies-- the National Police Agency, the Coast Guard, the National Intelligence 
Service, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, and the Ministry of Food, Agriculture, 
Forestry, and Fisheries, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade-- are each 
involved with the abduction issue.  But abduction is routinely subsumed under their 
larger, even more difficult responsibilities.  In the case of National Police Agency, for 
example, abductee issues are handled by the office on defectors.  A special Bureau for 
Compensation is staffed by secondees from several of these other units.   
 
The 2007 legislation provides compensation for three categories of victims.  If 
they were abducted for more than three years, the abductees themselves receive up to two 
hundred times the minimum monthly wage, in addition to housing and medical support.  
As of 2009, eighteen individuals qualified for this compensation.  The families of the 
abductees receive up to thirty-six times the minimum monthly wage as compensation for 
their loss of jobs and other state-mandated discrimination.  As of 2009, more than five 
hundred families received these allowances.  The final category for compensation is 
“disabled persons.”  This is a euphemism for those abductees who were tortured and 
physically maimed by the South Korean state.  As of 2009, only one individual received 
benefits under this category, but seven more cases are under consideration.  Complicating 
this investigation is the fact that many of the torturers remain in government and are 
fearful they will be identified.
84
  The irony of all this, according to one activist, is that 
there has not been a single confirmed case of a returned abductee confirmed to be a spy.  
To the contrary, he suggests, there were many cases in which the South Korean 
government falsely accused individuals of spying for political reasons.  As he put it 
directly: “To explain the government’s position, one must consider the unification issue 
in general.  South Korea could not be too tough because it, too, was an offender.”85 
 
This is clearly linked to the authoritarian nature of Korean politics before 1987 
and to divisions within the political class since then.  State vigilance vis-à-vis defectors 
and returned abductees did not end after the transition to democracy in South Korea.  By 
most accounts-- as in Japan prior to 1998-- the prospect of normalization and 
reconciliation prevented South Korean leaders from pressing the North for change in the 
abductee status quo even after the democratic transformation.  Whereas, the pre-
democratic ROK faced little pressure from public opinion, progressive forces in 
democratic Korea were reportedly so keen on reconciliation and its “Sunshine Policy” 
that it soft pedaled the abductee issue for fear of running the talks off the rails.  Arrington 
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suggests that the families’ demands were “sidelined” because “the government was loath 
to risk ‘big losses [by upsetting the talks] for small gain [for the families of the 
abductees].’”86  One activist insists that abductee groups were ignored by progressive 
governments because “they did not want problems surfacing during their negotiations 
with the North,” adding accusingly that “Kim Dae-jung promoted democracy for his own 
political gain.”87    
 
The cynical view of the Kim policies is often extended to the Uri Party and Roh 
Moo-hyun’s regime as well.  Human rights and abductee activists express more optimism 
about the conservative Grand National Party, which took power in 2007 under Lee 
Myung-bak.  This larger political division between “progressive” and “conservative” 
forces may be reflected within the Korean state structure, as there reportedly remain some 
within the bureaucracy who remain loyal to Kim Dae-jung and to Roh Moo-hyun’s 
policies.
88
  For these various reasons, then, the demands of the abductee activists have 
often been suppressed-- even after the shift to democracy in 1987.  According to one 
official, the very idea of identifying and retrieving the abductees has long been viewed as 
“mission impossible.”89  
 
As we have seen, while fundamental elements of the abduction story are the same 
as in Japan, the South Korean policy outcomes have, on balance, been quite different.  
We note, with Arrington, that South Korean and Japanese groups became particularly 
active at the time of a potentially historic change in international affairs.
90
 In both 
countries, moreover, families organized NGOs to press their case to the government and 
became more assertive after forming working alliances with broader, more ideological 
and nationalist groups-- human rights advocates in South Korea and revisionists in Japan.  
Despite efforts to coordinate their demand making, however, South Korea’s multiple 
civic associations have been far more fractured than Japan’s and have had far less 
political impact.
91
 As in Japan, the Korean media has been inconsistently attentive to the 
issue, but it suffered neither the intimidation nor has it exhibited the sharp swings that 
characterized Japanese coverage of the abductee issue.  Finally, we observe much thinner 
connections in Korea between the NGOs and both the political class and the state.  ROK 
leaders were able to ignore the media and interest groups with an insouciance that their 
Japanese counterparts could not sustain.  What explains this? 
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Conclusion  
 We can begin with the difference between Japanese and South Korean 
international relations.  Notwithstanding the many parallels noted above-- particularly the 
fact that both countries face the same principle enemy with the support of the same 
powerful ally-- Japanese politicians may have been freer to focus on the abduction issue 
and use it for domestic political gain.  This is plausible to the extent that Japanese leaders 
feel more secure from DPRK attack than their ROK counterparts, despite recent nuclear 
and missile threats.  Indeed, we note that Japan experienced a spasm of national 
indignation on the abductee issue and hardened its diplomacy toward the DPRK only 
after reaffirming with unprecedented vigor its allegiance to the United States after 9/11.  
South Korea, by contrast, may have been more reluctant to push the abductions issue 
because of the impact on national security interests and greater concerns over aggravating 
North Korea.  In short, the security context seems to provide room that political actors 
can then exploit to their domestic political advantage. Still, as we have seen, there has 
been little Japanese softening toward the DPRK in recent years, even though the US 
security commitment has come into question.
92
  Absent further evidence, therefore, this 
intuition falls well short of providing a comprehensive explanation for policy differences 
in these cases.    
 
 We are obliged, therefore, to look more closely at domestic factors to make sense 
of the divergence in South Korean and Japanese abductee politics-- ideology, 
partisanship, and institutions in particular.  Snyder’s model, as reviewed above, is most 
helpful with the latter-- particularly with reference to the Japanese case.  As he 
anticipates, the abductee groups in civil society (allied, and organized in part by, 
nationalist activists) won national attention at about the same time that LDP revisionists 
consolidated power from LDP pragmatists.
93
  Power was newly “cartelized,” making it 
possible for groups favoring an aggressive posture on the abductions to combine 
effectively with those favoring a more muscular security posture, and together effectively 
to shift-- Snyder would say “highjack”-- national policy.  The media (and with it public 
opinion) flipped, ensuring that a hard line view would be the default position of Japan’s 
national leaders.  Logrolls, misperceptions, and miscalculations ought to have been easier 
than ever, and that too is what we observe: Japanese foreign policy became so entangled 
in the abductee issue, that Japanese diplomats ceded their standing in the Six Party Talks 
to the Chinese and accomplished few of their larger security aims. 
 
Arrington, in her analysis of these two cases, takes a slightly different, but not 
unrelated, institutional tack.  Attributing policy differences to changes in “the relative 
power of the executive” in each country, she suggests that by 2000, the political class in 
both South Korea and Japan had come to dominate the career bureaucracy in matters of 
public policy.
94
 She argues that the shift in “the relative power of the executive” enabled 
Japanese and South Korean politicians to pursue their preferred paths vis-à-vis the 
abductees and North Korea.  In Japan this meant a more hard line course than in the past-
- i.e., a sharp veering away from normalization in favor of sanctions and a military build-
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up.  In South Korea, this meant the continued ability of presidents to ignore activists with 
impunity.  This is plausible, especially when combined with Snyder’s suggestion that the 
key to the highjacking of national policy rests in the extent to which foreign policy 
decision making can be cartelized by powerful interests.   
 
 But there are several reason why these institutional explanations fall short as well.   
First, we cannot know that ROK leaders insulated themselves from public demands by 
nature of their presidency because the public largely shrugged off the issue in South 
Korea where abduction is deeply embedded in much larger and more complex security 
concerns.  Moreover, the ROK government’s complicity in the denial of civil rights to 
abductees suspected of spying and defection provides further incentive for the 
government to ignore demands from abductee groups.  Likewise, in Japan until the 
2000s, the preferences of the pragmatic wing of the LDP were consistent with those of 
the professional bureaucrats.  Both wanted to explore normalization with Pyongyang and 
both therefore preferred to ignore the abductee issue.  It was not until hard line LDP 
leaders with a demonstrated antipathy for North Korea consolidated power that the 
abductee issue was elevated in the national discourse.  These leaders did not depend on 
administrative reform for their empowerment as much as they depended upon their own 
electoral success.   
 
If either the cartelization of interests or the centralization of executive authority is 
to explain South Korean and Japanese responses to the abductee issue, we should also 
observe change over time in each case.  But there is little change in the South Korean 
case, despite the extraordinary shift from authoritarianism to democracy in 1987.  
Political preferences and the abductee issues have been aligned across that great 
structural divide.  Before 1987, South Korean civil society was underdeveloped and, 
without elections, organized interests could be ignored by the state with impunity.  But 
how can we explain this same outcome after competitive electoral institutions were 
established?  That we observe marginal change in government policy on the abductee 
issue and only limited vulnerability to pressure from the abductee groups suggests the 
weakness of the groups at least as much as the structural insularity of the politicians.  It is 
not reasonable to assume that the centralization of executive power-- or the cartelization 
of interests-- was the same after 1987 as it was before democratization.  If structural 
change were a plausible explanation, we should be observing change-- and far more 
pressure on the executive.   
There clearly was more change in the Japanese case.  As Snyder would expect, we 
did observe a “mainstreaming” of the right, and a closing of ranks around nationalist, if 
not expansionist, goals for a time.  We also observed the cloaking of these ideas in the 
mantle of national interest.  But now that the LDP has been routed and the “cartel” of 
revisionists and nationalist interest groups has been displaced, we should expect less 
hawkish policy toward the DPRK and a return to the “normalization” path, what Snyder 
refers to as a correction for excesses.  At a minimum, we should expect the abductee 
issue to become less determinative of Japanese foreign policy.  Prime Minister 
Hatoyama’s rhetoric and public assurances notwithstanding, however, that is not what we 
observe.  As noted above, the Hatoyama Administration informed Chinese and South 
Korean government officials that Japan will pursue the proliferation issue “in parallel” 
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with the abductee issue in the Six Party Talks and promised that the abductee issue 
“should not present an obstacle to the Six party Talks.”95  Moreover, Hatoyama’s DPJ 
promised to wrest control of public policy from the hands of the bureaucrats, and thus has 
been attacking Snyder’s “cartel.”  In the event however, Prime Minister Hatoyama shifted 
Japanese policy on the abductees and the DPRK very little.  He has met repeatedly with 
Kazokai leaders and he appointed a DPRK hardliner, Nakai Hiroshi to the cabinet to 
serve in the cabinet as both National Public Safety Commissioner and “abductee issue 
czar.”  Nakai has added Investigative Commission activists to the Abduction Policy 
Headquarters and, in February 2010, announced that the Japanese government would 
exclude Pyongyang-affiliated schools from the new government’s policy of waiving 
tuition fees for high school students.
96
  The prime minister meekly followed suit in what 
was widely reported as a new effort to ratchet up pressure on North Korea.
97
   
 
We turn, then, to ideological explanations.  Without regard for institutional forms, 
leaders in South Korea before and after 1987 and in Japan before and after the revisionist 
consolidation either embraced the abductee issue or chose not to do so consistent with 
their political preferences.  Arrington acknowledges this in the South Korean case by 
noting that recent presidents have been “pro-engagement progressives,” adding that “their 
favored policy of engagement with North Korea has become a near-hegemonic policy 
idea in South Korea, meaning that the FADN’s demands for reciprocity from the North 
encountered fewer political supporters.”98  It has been widely reported that Kim Dae-jung 
(himself kidnapped and nearly assassinated by the pre-democratic ROK intelligence 
services in 1973) did not encourage or empower the abductee groups.  But it is not just 
about progressives.  As we have seen, even the conservative Lee government seems quite 
clear that efforts by NGOs to undermine DPRK authority are unwelcome.   Hence we 
cannot fully credit ideology as a consistent predictor of the differences we observe.   
Likewise, as noted above, the progressive DPJ is no softer on the DPRK than was its 
predecessor, the conservative LDP. 
 
This suggests that partisanship also fails to do sufficient heavy lifting.  One 
explanation of the failure of the ROK government to act is that both the Kim Dae-jung 
and Roh Tae-woo governments did not have to contend with (or mollify) conservative 
factions, allowing them space to focus on engagement with Pyongyang and weakening 
the political access of forces opposed to it.  But with the onset of the Lee Myung-bak 
government, South Korean policy persists.  Nor, as reported above, was the transition 
from sixty years of LDP governance to DPJ rule accompanied by a softening in 
diplomacy toward Pyongyang or a turn away from the Japanese family associations and 
their right wing allies. 
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Thus, we have here more than a story of successful and unsuccessful 
“mobilization” of (and “capture” by) interest groups in Japan and Korea.  Policies often 
changed-- or failed to change-- without regard to shifts between “cartelized” and 
competitive structures or structural stasis.  Nor has there been sufficient structural change 
in the regional security system to credit international factors with causal power.  Finally, 
as we have seen, neither ideology nor partisanship can carry the full interpretive load.  
We have here parallel stories of opportunistic political leaders who have been able to 
operate effectively to their own political advantage within a wide range of domestic and 
international constraints.  The ROK political class that was focused on improving 
relations with the DPRK was determined to prevent human rights issues (including 
abductions) from interfering with their larger political agenda.  In Japan, too, an entire 
regime was replaced, but its priorities have remained politically viable.  
 
In short, then, the policy differences we have identified defy systematic structural 
explanation in either the international or domestic arenas.  They remind us that political 
agency operates within the constraints of domestic and international politics, but that 
these constraints-- including institutions, ideology, and partisanship-- can be stretched 
and exploited by skilled political actors.  This is, of course, an old lesson, but it is one of 
which we frequently need reminding: Neither the structure of international power nor the 
institutions and animating ideas of domestic politics are individually determinant of 
policy choice. 
 
 
**********  
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